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SOVIET-AMERICAN TRADE: SOME
PROBLEMS OF SOCIALIST LAW
REQUIRING TREATY
CLARIFICATION
William Henry Tuttle*
Increased trade between the United States and the Soviet
Union has become a subject of primary concern to the present Ad-
ministration in Washington;' and a concerted effort has been made
by the Administration to interest legislators and businessmen in such
trade expansion and to induce them into taking the prerequisite steps
to that end.2
If American businessmen are to be encouraged to venture into
the unfamiliar commercial world of state foreign trade monopoly
and state planned economy, they must be protected in their private
contracts from the juridical effects of certain unfamiliar rules of law
derived from these monolithic socialist institutions.
Article 128 of The Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the
U.S.S.R. and Union Republics states:
A foreign law shall not apply where its application contradicts the
fundamental principles of the Soviet system.8
* B.A., 1948, LL.B., 1961, LL.M., 1963, University of California, Berkeley;
Instructor, Foothill College, Los Altos, California; member, California Bar.
1 In his "State of the Union Message," January 10, 1967, President Johnson
specifically asked Congress to pass an East-West trade bill and to approve a
consular convention with the Soviet Union . . . ." 25 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY,
Weekly Report, No. 2 at 42, 44, 79-80 (1967). See generally 23 CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, Weekly Report, No. 11 at 383-89 (1965).
2 See, e.g., Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on U.S.S.R. Consular
Treaty. 25 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, Weekly Report, No. 4 at 121 (1967). The
Senate ratification of a Soviet-American consular treaty, March 16, 1967, is the "first
legislative endorsement of the Administration's East-West 'bridge building policy' .
San Francisco Chronicle, March 17, 1967, p. 1, col. 2.
3 SoviET CivIL LEGISLATION AND PROCEDURE, OFFICIAL TEXTS AND CORMENTARIES
114 (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1964) [hereinafter cited as
SCL&P]. The Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and Union Republics
[hereinafter cited in text and footnotes as FCIvL] and The Fundamentals of Civil
Procedure [hereinafter cited as FCivP] were adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the
U.S.S.R. on December 8, 1961, and came into force on May 1, 1962. On the basis of
the FCIvL and FCIvP, new civil codes are to be enacted by the fifteen constituent
Republics of the U.S.S.R. Commentary on the Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the
U.S.S.R. [hereinafter cited as Commentary FCivL] is by Prof. S. N. Bratus, J.D.,
Prof. E. A. Fleishits, J.D., R. 0. Khalfina, J.D.; Commentary on the Basic Principles
of Soviet Legislation on Civil Procedure [hereinafter cited as Commentary FCIVP]
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However, the dominance of the "fundamental principles of the Soviet
system" over foreign law may be overcome by treaty.
Article 129 of The Fundamentals of Civil Legislation states:
Where an international treaty or international agreement to which
the USSR is party establishes rules other than those contained in Soviet
civil legislation, the rules of the international treaty or international
agreement shall apply.4
The purpose of this article is to investigate the effect on Ameri-
can legal doctrine of certain rules of law peculiar to the Soviet
socialist system to which the above Article 128 would undoubtedly
apply and, in regard to which, the Congress should provide Ameri-
can businessmen adequate and appropriate treaty protection, namely
(1) the common law doctrine of apparent or ostensible authority
vis-a-vis "special rules" of the Soviet foreign trade monopoly, (2)
the doctrine of impossibility of performance vis-a-vis the "law of the
plan," and (3) the right to sue on the contract vis-a-vis the sovereign
immunity of Soviet Trade Delegations.
THE STATE MONOPOLY OF FOREIGN TRADE
The real "curtain" that surrounds the Soviet Union is the
economic "curtain" created and maintained by the institution of
state foreign trade monopoly. It is this "curtain" which insulates and
protects the planned, socialist economy of the Soviet Union from the
unplanned, market economy of the capitalist world.
Article 14 of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics provides:
The jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as
represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state
administration, embraces:
(h) Foreign trade on the basis of state monopoly.5
The policy of foreign trade monopoly as set forth in the 1936
Soviet Constitution is reflective of pre-existing Soviet law, since the
business of engaging in international commerce was nationalized by
the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars April 22, 1918.6
is by Prof. M. A. Gurvich, J.D., V. K. Puchinsky, J. Cand. See also, Ramzaitsev,
Importance of the New Principles of Civil Legislation and Procedure for Regulating
Foreign Economic Relations of the U.S.S.R., 1963 SOVIET YEAR-BOoK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (hereinafter cited as SOVIET YEAR-BOoK) 407-419 (English summary at 417-419).
4 Ibid. Article 64 of the FCrvP in SCL&P at 175 contains similar language. See
also, Grevtsova, Importance of International Treaties as a Source of Soviet National
Law, 1963 SOVIET YEAR-BooK 171-79 (English summary at 179).
5 MOORE, MODERN CONSTITUTIONS 215 (1957).
6 1 SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON FOREION POLICY 71 (Degras ed. 1952).
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
The April 22 Decree was refined and rendered specific by a Decree
of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council
of People's Commissars, October 16, 1922, which states in part:
4. Liability in connextion with foreign transactions is borne by the
State only when contracts are concluded and signed by the Commis-
sariat for Foreign Trade, or by trade delegations of the RSFSR in
particular countries, or by institutions and individuals specially au-
thorized for each separate transaction by a decision of the All-Russian
Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars,
the Council of Labour and Defence, or the People's Commissariat for
Foreign Trade.7
The principle of foreign trade monopoly is found in Section 17 of
the Russian Civil Code:
All persons in the R.S.F.S.R., legal entities and human beings, shall
participate in foreign trade only through the medium of the government
as represented by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Independent appear-
ances in the foreign market shall not be permitted except under the
control of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.8
The Soviet trade monopoly doctrine is enforced by maintaining
strict control over the form of foreign trade transactions concluded
by Soviet organizations, as is indicated by the "special rule" laid
down by Article 125 of the Fundamentals of Civil Legislation:
The form of foreign trade transactions concluded by Soviet
organisations, and the procedure governing their signature, regard-
less of the place where such transactions are concluded, shall be
determined by the legislation of the U.S.S.R.9
The particular formalities demanded under Soviet law are not ex-
tensive, nor are they innovations in commercial law; however, the
requirement that they be universally applied is most significant:
All such transactions must be made in writing. No oral expression
of will relating to the foreign trade of the U.S.S.R. has any juridical
force, even where such is recognized by the law of the place of making.
The essential point in the signing of foreign trade transactions is that
this is done by two [Soviet] persons. Lists of persons authorised to
sign are published in the established manner, and, in addition, the
government of the country of stay is notified of the names of persons
authorised to sign transactions concluded by the trade mission of the
U.S.S.R. or its branches. These rules determine the powers vested
in trade delegates or representatives of Soviet foreign trade associations
to perform certain acts giving rise to juridical consequences, and are
7 Id. at 338-39.
8 2 GsovsKi, SoVer Crvmr LAW 34 (1949). Although the text reads "all persons in
the R.S.F.S.R.," it is understood that the monopoly refers to the entire Soviet Union(U.S.S.R.) which was officially formed after the promulgation of the Civil Code. Ibid.
9 SCL&P 113.
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extraterritorial, i.e., are mandatory for foreign courts as well. (Emphasis
added.) 10
The Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission, a permanent arbi-
tral institution attached to the All-Union Chamber of Commerce of
the U.S.S.R. at Moscow," has consistently applied the "special rule"
in cases involving Soviet foreign trade organizations.' The require-
ment of a writing and rejection of any oral expression inconsistent
with the written contract is strictly adhered to,'" as is the signatory
10 Commentary FCivL in SCL&P at 52-53. Article 14, FCivL in SCL&P at 63-64,
defines "legal transactions" and further states "Failure to comply with the form
prescribed by law shall entail invalidation of the legal transaction only if such con-
sequence is expressly provided by law. Non-compliance with the form of foreign trade
transactions and the procedure governing their signature (Article 125 of the present
Fundamentals) shall entail invalidation of the transaction." SCL&P at 64. (Emphasis
added.)
11 The Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission was established by the Statute of
June 17, 1932. Statute of Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission, U.S.S.R. Laws, 1932,
text 211, in 2 Gsovsxi, supra note 8, at 651. On the work of the Commission see
generally Hazard, Soviet Commercial Arbitration, 1 INT'L AB. J. 8 (1945) ; Pisar, The
Communist System of Foreign Trade Adjudication, 72 HARv. L. Rav. 1409 (1959);
Ramzaitsev, Arbitration in Soviet Foreign Trade, 4 LAw IN THE SERVICE OF PEACE 125
(December 1957) ; Hilton, Policies and Practices of the U.S.S.R. with Respect to
International Private Arbitration, September, 1946 (unpublished thesis in the American
University Library, Washington, D.C.); Tuttle, Soviet Socialist Foreign Trade Arbitra-
tion, December, 1962 (unpublished thesis in the University of California Library,
Berkeley, Columbia University Library, New York, American Arbitration Association
Library, New York, Legal Office of United Nations, New York).
12 See generally, Ramzaitsev, Activity of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Com-
mission in Moscow in 1957, 1958 SoVIET YEAR-BooK 463; and also Ramzaitsev, supra
note 11 at 128.
It is important to understand that Soviet foreign trade is carried on, in the main,
by some twenty giant corporations (Combines), each of which is a specialist in and has
jurisdiction over trading certain general lines of products or commodities. The
corporate charters of the Combines, issued pursuant to a decree of the Ministry of
Foreign Trade, embody the trade monopoly rules under discussion. For example,
paragraph 11 of the Charter of the All-Union Export-Import Combine, "Sudoimport,"
states that all contracts of foreign trade concluded in Moscow or abroad "must be
signed by two persons who have received, under powers of attorney signed by the
President of the Combine, the right of first and second signing." TRADE RESEARCH
ASSOCIATES, U.S.-SOVIET TRADE 79-80 (1960) [hereinafter cited as TRADE RESEARCH].
This requirement is then passed on, for instance, to the Russian-owned Amtorg
Trading Corporation of New York under specific, written agency agreements between
Amtorg and the various Combines whose interests it represents in the American market.
See, for example, the Agreement between Amtorg and the Combine "Avtoexport" in
TRADE RESEARCH 68-70.
13 For example, the defense of the Soviet Combine that a duly signed contract
should be interpreted in the light of the oral negotiations which took place before the
contract was signed, was rejected by the Commission in favor of a Dutch firm, and
parol evidence offered by the Russian defendant was refused in the case Kattenburg v.
Technoeksport (1937), RAmzArrSEV, VNESHNETORGOVyi ARBrRAZH v. SSSR (Foreign
Trade Arbitration in the U.S.S.R.) 33 (1952) [hereinafter cited as 1952 F.T.A. and to
other volumes in same series 1941 or 1957 F.TA.]; Pisar, Soviet Conflict of Laws in
International Commercial Transactions, 70 HARv. L. REv. 593, 653 n.199 (1957). And
in the case A & P Import Company v. Raznoexport (1938), the Commission held that
the terms of a contract for the sale of goods made by a Soviet agency to a Canadian
1967]
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requirement of "two authorised persons."" And the Russian Com-
mission has reiterated the universality doctrine that the trade mo-
nopoly rules "are subject to application even in those cases when
corresponding foreign trade orders fall under action of the law of
other countries," 5 and "even had the litigation taken place in a
foreign forum."'
The Soviet rationale for its position on the universality of the
"special rule" of the state foreign trade monopoly is based upon the
international legal doctrine of state sovereignty:
Regardless of whether there is "recognition of the foreign trade
monopoly on the part of a given state," certain inescapable "contract
norms arise from the fact that foreign trade relations of the USSR
are realized on the basis of its sovereign right .... Thus owing to the
international-legal meaning of the state foreign trade monopoly on the
part of the USSR, the norms of Soviet law which determine the form
of foreign trade contracts to which Soviet organizations are parties
are subject to application also to such contracts concluded outside the
territory of the USSR .... In view of this, the application of Soviet
law which determines the form of foreign trade contracts must take
place also in those cases where disputes concerning such contracts are
examined abroad." 1
corporation could not be varied by the oral statement of a Soviet official even though
he was the president of the Soviet agency, 1941 F.TA. 24-26; see also, Hilton, supra
note 11, at 79-80.
14 A & P Import Company v. Raznoexport (1938), 1941 F.T.A. 24-26. And in the
case of Chenker et Cie v. V/O Raznoimport (1937), the claimant, a French stock-
holding company demanded payment for the transportation of horses for the defendant
(Combine) at a rate higher than that established in the contract on the basis of a
promise (oral) given to it by the defendant. In denying payment at the increased rate,
the Commission reviewed the legal history of the rule requiring a writing signed by two
authorized persons and ruled that "According to the evident meaning of the law this
procedure must be observed also in changes of foreign trade orders already concluded."
1941 F.T.A. 25-26, Hilton, supra note 11, at 78-79; see also Ramzaitsev, supra note 11,
at 131.
In Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp. 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942),
the Russian-owned trading company (see note 12, supra) was sued for breach of a
ship charter agreement. In its answer to the libel, Amtorg raised as a defense that no
one "authorized to act for it had so agreed." Id. at 980. The court did not meet the
issue of general contractual validity; however it did find a valid arbitration agree-
ment in the charter instrument. (The legal effect of the trade monopoly doctrine
unfortunately was not argued on appeal.) In sending the dispute, on its merits, to
arbitration, the circuit court instructed that any further determination of the validity
of the contract must be returned to the court in accordance with American law. Id. at
985.
15 Chenker et Cie v. V/O Raznoimport (1937), 1941 F.T.A. 25-26 (see note 14,
supra) ; see also Ramzaitsev, supra note 12, at 468.
16 Gebreders Kats v. Eksportkleb (1936), 1941 F.T.A. 34; Pisar, supra note 13, at
645 n.166.
17 Ramzaitsev, supra note 12, at 468, and 1952 F.T.A. 32; in Pisar supra note 13,
at 645 n.200, it is stated
The judicial organs of foreign states, in deciding cases falling within theirjurisdictions involving the issue of the validity of a contract concluded in the
name of the U.S.S.R. trade delegation, or in the name of a Soviet foreign-
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The strict maintenance of the few formal requirements of
Article 125 of the Fundamentals of Civil Legislation i" is of great
importance to the Soviet Union; the rules are obviously regarded as
basic to the socialist institution of foreign trade monopoly, and as
such would enjoy the protection afforded by Article 128 of the
Fundamentals of Civil Legislation. 1" This conclusion must follow;
otherwise Article 125 seriously conflicts with Article 126 of the
Fundamentals of Civil Legislation, which purports to codify inter-
nationally accepted principles of conflict of laws:
The rights and duties of the parties to a foreign trade transaction shall
be determined pursuant to the laws of the place where it is concluded,
unless otherwise provided by agreement of the parties.
20
Soviet jurists and the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission at
Moscow have long recognized and applied the conflict of laws doc-
trines of party autonomy2' and law of the place of contracting.22 The
comments of the Russian legal scholar, L. A. Lunz, bear this out:
Questions of the conflict of laws regarding international sale and
purchase arise mainly in connection with contracts with capitalist firms
The main principle regarding conflict of laws applied to inter-
national sale contracts is that of lex voluntatis. The essence of this is
that the parties may choose the law to which they wish to make their
reciprocal obligations subject. It is here a question solely of the actual
intention of the parties voiced expressis verbis or tacito consensu ....
The work of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission gives no
grounds for the assertion that under Soviet law regarding conflict of
laws, the parties' choice of law is restricted.
trade organization, should apply the provisions of Soviet law. A contrary
view by a foreign court would amount to an infringment of the sovereign
rights of the Soviet State.
18 SCL&P 113.
19 SCL&P 114.
20 SCL&P 113. It should also be noted that Article 15 of FCrvL restates the
fundamental rule of Agency: "A transaction performed by one party (the agent) in the
name of another party (the principal) in virtue of powers based on a power-of-
attorney, law, or administrative act, immediately establishes, modifies and terminates
the civil rights and duties of the principal." Id. at 64.
21 V/O Soiuzugleeksport v. (Egyptian firm) Yusef Ibrahim and Sadik Legeta
(1938), Hilton, supra note 11, at 70, in which the Foreign Trade Arbitration Com-
mission applied the contractually chosen Soviet law though the result was adverse to
the Soviet party. See also, Ramzaitsev, supra note 11, at 129; Ramzaitsev, supra note
12, at 468.
22 In cases before the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission, Belgian law applied
as lex loci contractus in Necton (Belgian firm) v. Prodintorg (All-Union Combine)
(1957), 1958 SovIET YEAR-BoOK, at 469; English law applied in Hollis Braziers v.
Elksportles (1957), ibid.; and Danish law was applied in Danish Corniced Firm v.
Eksportkhleb (1957), id. at 470. Furthermore, when the Commission has determined
that a certain foreign law shall govern the contractual relations of the parties, "that
law is aplied by the FTAC in the same degree and in the same manner as it is in that
foreign country." Ibid. See also, Ramzaitsev, supra note 11, at 129.
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This choice cannot be opposed by objections based on the fact that
the legislation chosen has no connection with the actual transaction.
The establishment of the proper law of the contract based on the
choice of the parties is fundamentally a matter of choosing a common
legislation to the whole of the contract, not of making the settlement
of some disputes subject to one law and the settlement of others to
another. (Emphasis added.)
The parties' choice of a foreign law takes the relations between
the parties out of the sphere not only of presumptive but also of
imperative rules of lex fori. If a transaction is subject to foreign law,
then it is subject to the foreign State's rules regarding the statute of
limitations although Soviet law in this respect is imperative ....
(Emphasis added.)
In cases where the intention of the parties regarding the proper
law of the contract is not expressed, the proper law of the contract
is the lex loci contractus.23
Dr. Lunz then goes on to state the exception to the rule, that the lex
voluntatis and lex loci contractus are nonetheless subject to the
omnipotent imperative rules of the foreign trade monopoly:
But a transaction may not be subjected to foreign law in violation
of . . . the rules governing the form and procedure for the signing of
foreign trade contracts to which a Soviet organization is a party. These
rules prevail over foreign law in the event of conflict and may in no
case be violated. 24
The inevitable problem may be posed. An American firm con-
cludes a contract with representatives of -the New York Amtorg
Trading Corporation acting on behalf of a Soviet All-Union Export-
Import Combine25 under factual circumstances that would give rise to
a valid contract under the common law doctrine of apparent or
ostensible authority; yet, the contract was signed by only one autho-
rized person on Amtorg's part, thus rendering the contract invalid
under Soviet "special" law.2" A dispute arises against Amtorg and the
case comes before a New York court with American (New York)
law chosen as the law of the contract. Amtorg raises the logical
defense that the transaction was illegal under Soviet law and asserts
that Soviet law on that issue must control. Does the court apply the
law of the sovereign state of the U.S.S.R. over the chosen law of the
sovereign state of New York? There is no ready answer to this
question.27
28 Lunz, The Law of International Sale and Purchase (Soviet Practice Regarding
Conflict of Laws), 1960 SovrT YEAR-BooK 261 (English summary at 276-77).
24 Id. at 276.
25 See note 12, supra.
26 I.e., Article 125, FCrvL, in SCL&P at 113.
27 Consider, however, Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corporation,
discussed in note 14, supra.
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It is possible the American court following established principles
of contract and agency would find valid a contract not recognized
under Soviet law; or it could find that Amtorg Corporation would be
estopped from denying the validity of the contract where the Ameri-
can party had no notice of the formal requirements attached to
Amtorg's express authority. If this result were to follow, and as-
suming enforcement of the judgment in Russia is necessary, the
next important consideration would be whether the Russian courts
would refuse to enforce the foreign judgment on the grounds that it
contradicts Soviet public policy. 8
On the other hand, the court might find some guidance in the
case of Camden Fibre Mills Inc. v. Amtorg Trading Corp.29 There,
Camden, an American firm, had agreed to arbitrate any disputes
arising from its contract with Amtorg before the Foreign Trade
Arbitration Commission at Moscow. When a dispute arose, Camden
refused to so arbitrate on the grounds it would not get a fair hearing
by the state-dominated Commission. The court ruled against Camden
as follows:
In this instance, although respondent may not have known in
detail how the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce Foreign Trade Arbitra-
tion Commission was constituted, it is chargeable with notice as
recently as 1947 that such an organization could not function in the
U.S.S.R. unless it were subject to over-all control by the Soviet
Government. Having entered into such an arbitration agreement, it
does not lie in respondent's mouth at this point to declare that it was
ignorant of this matter of common knowledge. (Emphasis added.)
8 0
If an American firm is to be charged with notice of the political
structure of Soviet socialist institutional organization, it could also
be argued that it be charged with notice of the legal structure of the
fundamental socialist institution of foreign trade monopoly, in-
cluding the formal restrictions it imposes on foreign trade trans-
actions. That is to say, under the above rule of the Camden Fibre
Mills case, the American firm, in the problem posed, could be charged
with notice of the nature and extent of the express authority vested in
Amtorg Trading Corporation, and its contract would stand invalid
28 See Article 128 of the FClvL cited in the text at note 3, supra.
29 277 App. Div. 531, 100 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1950).
30 Id. at 53, 100 N.Y.S.2d at 748. Interestingly, the Russian Chamber of Com-
merce and the attached Arbitration Commission are "social" or "public" organizations
and as such are distinguished from "state" organizations under Soviet law by the fact
that membership in them is voluntary and their members participate in the administra-
tion of their affairs. Berman, The Legal Framework of Trade Between Planned and
Market Economies: The Soviet-American Example, 24 LAW & CONTVMIP. PROB. 482,
493 (1959). There is no valid basis for the assertion that the Soviet state controls
decisions of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission. For a detailed study of this
point, see Tuttle, supra note 11, at 52-66.
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for want of proper formality. This would seem a harsh and in-
equitable result.
The extraterritorial effect of Article 125 of the Fundamentals of
Civil Legislation of the U.S.S.R."' should be considered in connection
with any negotiations for a treaty of trade between the United States
and the Soviet Union. It may be suggested that a simple treaty
solution to the hypothetical problem posed would be to impose a duty
on the Soviet trade representative to give written notice of the for-
mal requirements of Soviet law to the American firm with which it is
doing business, and upon breach of this duty, the Soviet party would
be presumed at fault if the contract thereafter failed for want of
the formality required by Soviet law.
THE STATE PLANNED ECONOMY AND THE DOCTRINE OF
IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE
Article 4 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. provides that the
economic life of the Soviet Union shall be determined and directed
by the state economic plan. 2
It is difficult to imagine a more complicated system of economy
than that introduced in Russia in 1928 under the First Five-Year
Plan."3 A glance at the myriad bureaucratic details which compose
this vast and total plan of economic life is useful and probably
necessary to an understanding of the problem to be discussed below.
The National Economic Plan is the central coordinating mech-
anism of the Soviet economy. It outlines the goals to be accomplished
during a given period and directs the allocation of all resources
toward the fulfillment of stated goals. The Plan prescribes the
national income objectives, the physical volume of production for
all major commodities, and divides the national income between in-
vestment and consumption. The volume and composition of both
domestic and foreign trade as well as the pricing of commodities are
traditionally governed by the Plan. 4 The circulation of all money
is considered in estimating the distribution of popular income among
purchasers of consumer goods, bank savings, government bonds and
31 The "special" rule governing formality of Soviet foreign trade transactions.
See text at notes 9 and 10, supra.
32 MOORE, MODERN CONSTITUTIONs 212 (1957).
33 See generally, CAMPBELL, SOVIET ECONOMIC POWER, 12-21 (1960); DOBB,
SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1917, 230-60 (1948); SCHUMAN, RussIA SINCE
1917, 143-56 (1957) ; SCHWARTZ, RussIA's SOVIET ECONOMY, 117 (2d ed. 1954).
34 No attempt will be made here to discuss the apparent introduction of the "free
market" concept of "supply and demand" into the operation of certain Russian
industries. Russian authorities have stated such innovations are not to be interpreted
as a departure from the basic concept of planned economy.
[Vol. 7
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direct taxes. Further, the annual government budget is integrated
with the overall plan of the economy. In short, the Soviet economic
plan "is a gigantic, comprehensive blueprint that attempts to govern
economic activities and interrelations of all persons and institutions
in the U.S.S.R., as well as the economic relations of the U.S.S.R.
with other countries ... from the central headquarters in Moscow." 5
Now there exists in Soviet society an equilibrium between Plan
and Law. "Soviet economists and jurists speak of the interdepen-
dence of Plan and Law. Planning is the integrating, social, dynamic
element; legality is the decentralizing, personal, stabilizing ele-
ment .... Plan is that aspect of the social process which is concerned
with the rational use of institutions and resources from the point
of view of economic development; law is that aspect of the social
process which is concerned with the formalizing and enforcement
of social policy (plan) in terms of the personal and property rights
and duties arising therefrom."86
Although the Plan when adopted is not the Law, the Law
nevertheless imposes a positive duty on individuals and institutions
to carry out the Plan according to its specifications. It is the direc-
tives issued from the higher authority relative to Plan fulfillment
which become in part the positive Law of the land. Article 4 of the
Fundamentals of Civil Legislation entitled, "Grounds from which
Civil Rights and Duties Arise," reads in part:
.... ,civil rights and duties arise:
... from administrative acts, including-for state, co-operative,
and mass organizations-planning acts; .... (Emphasis added.) 3 7
35 From SCHWARTZ, supra note 33, at 146. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. further
provides that at the head of the national economy, responsible both for making and
for executing the plan, shall be the All-Union Council of Ministers (Article 68) ; and
that this body in which the leading planning, industrial, agricultural, commercial and
financial organizations are represented (Article 70), shall also be the highest executive
and administrative organ of the state (Article 64) whose decisions and orders shall be
binding throughout the territory of the U.S.S.R. (Articles 66, 67). MOORE, MODERN
CONSTITUTIONS, 225-26 (1957). The State Planning Commission, Gosplan, which draws
up the perspective (five or seven year plan), annual and quarterly (working) plans
for the Soviet Union, is an administrative body serving the Council of Ministers.
BERMAN, JUSTICE in RussiA, 55 (1950).
36 BERMAN, supra note 35, at 54.
87 SCL&P 59. Sanctions may be imposed for failure to perform "planning acts."
E.g., GRANiCK, THE RFD ExEcuTivE, 133-34 (1961); SCHWARTZ, supra note 33, at
191-94. "Administrative acts, including planning acts for state, co-operative and mass
organisations, may, in cases established by law, immediately produce civil legal
obligations. Thus, an approved goods haulage plan gives rise to an obligation for the
carrier to make available means of conveyance and an obligation for the consignor to
make due use of them (for example, to load cars, sea going river vessels, etc., without
delay). Most frequently, however, an administrative act does not directly produce a
civil legal obligation, but an obligation to enter into a contract in accordance with the
instructions of the administrative (as a rule, planning) act, which are elaborated in the
1967]
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Certain procedures and criteria, economic and legal, must necessarily
be followed under this process. "These procedures and criteria con-
stitute what might be called the law of the plan, a field nonexistent
in our society.""8
To conclude this brief and insufficient glance at Soviet planning,
it must be noted that, as is the case with all Soviet commercial activ-
ities, the import and export procedures of the giant trade Combines 9
are integrally related to the overall Plan of national economy. °
Now it would seem obvious that the "law of the plan" could
not be imposed as such on foreign merchants. However, the Awards
rendered in two domestic arbitrations4 in the Soviet Union would
seem to indicate that foreign merchants could be subjected to the
"law of the plan" by virtue of its positive effect on the traditional
doctrine of impossibility of performance:
The Mogilev enterprise "Ob' edineniye" was respondent in a number
of suits brought against it in the Mogilev oblast state arbitration
tribunal for breaches of contract to supply shawls made out of a
special fabric. The respondent showed that when the contracts were
concluded at the end of 1957 the fabric in question was not subject
to planning control, but early in 1958 it was brought under planning
control by the Government of the Belorussian SSR and no allocations
of it were made to " 'Ob' edineniye." It was therefore factually im-
possible for it to make and supply these shawls, and the actions for
breach of contract were dismissed. (Emphasis added.)
42
• . . if an automobile plant has contracted to manufacture a dozen
lorries for a customer, and it is then directed by a planning authority
to switch its production entirely to passenger vehicles, it would actually
be in breach of its planning obligations to continue to manufacture
the lorries, and it has a defence to an action brought by the customer.
(Emphasis added.) 43
The above arbitral decisions must be evaluated in the light of
traditional Soviet jurisprudence, which recognizes three basic condi-
tions that may give rise to a valid defense under the doctrine of
contract made by the parties in accordance with the planning act." Commentary
FCivL, in SCL&P at 24.
38 BERMAN, supra note 35, at 95. "The Plan, in Stalin's words, is not merely a
program but it is rather a 'creative process,' embracing all aspects of production and
distribution; it is 'a living reality.' Planning is not finished until the plans are
executed. . . ." Id. at 57.
39 See note 12, supra.
40 TRADE RESEARCH 64-66. The import and export procedures of Soviet Combines
are discussed in detail in 10 SovIET STUDIEs 397-98 (1959).
41 Disputes between domestic socialist (state-owned) commercial enterprises must
be settled by Gosarbitrazh, the State Arbitration Commission. See generally, Collard,
State Arbitration in the U.S.S.R., 18 MODERN LAW REv. 474 (1955).
42 Johnson, Planning and Contract Law, 12 SOVIET STuDiEs 263, 266 (1961).
43 Ibid.
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impossibility of performance, namely, where (1) performance has
become impossible in fact, (2) performance has become impossible
at law, and (3) performance has become morally impossible."
Performance of a contract is impossible in fact whenever a situ-
ation has arisen which makes it actually or objectively impossible to
fulfill the obligations of the contract.45 The position of the Foreign
Trade Arbitration Commission at Moscow is stated as follows:
In cases where the party responsible for fulfilling the obligation
(debtor) claims the impossibility of carrying out the contract, the
Commission holds that in order to exculpate himself the debtor must
not only produce evidence of the circumstances which made fulfillment
of his liabilities impossible, but also prove the impossibility of prevent-
ing those circumstances.46
A valid defense of factual impossibility (to deliver promised
shipments of ore) was recognized by the Commission in the case
Czechoslovak Ceramics v. Exportal (1957)," where its finding of
fact showed:
• . . that an insurmountable force in the form of unusually heavy
(1954-1955) snow drifts brought about a termination of auto transport
within the area of the country where the ore subject to delivery was
mined. Communications in that part of the country could be carried
out only by air.
48
The performance of a contract is impossible at law "whenever
the subject matter of the contract becomes unlawful. 49 "Such is the
case whenever the performance of an act contemplated by the con-
tract is afterwards forbidden by law or by an order of some duly
authorized body."50
44 Agarkov, The Debtor's Discharge from Liability When Performance is Im-
possible (under the Soviet Law), 29 JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 9 (1947). See also Sections 118, 119, 129 R.S.F.S.R. CIVIL CODE
(U.S.S.R.); 2 Gsovsxi, supra note 8, at 107-08, 110.
45 And only where there is objective or actual impossibility "is there impossibility
of performance in the proper sense of the word." Agarkov, supra note 44, at 10.
46 Ramzaitsev, supra note 11, at 132.
47 Ramzaitsev, supra note 12, at 466, 467, 473.
48 Id. at 473.
49 Agarkov, supra note 44, at 10.
50 Ibid. Soviet law attaches no importance to the difference which exists between
"so called initial impossibility, i.e., one existing at the time the contract was made and
supervening impossibility." For example: A contract may be annulled on the ground of
initial impossibility; for instance a contract induced by misrepresentation or fraud as to
the possibility of performance may be held voidable. (S. 32 of the Civil Code.) If both
the parties were aware of the impossibility the contract may be held invalid as
fictitious, i.e., one not intended to be of any legal consequence. (S. 34 of the Civil
Code.) Finally, if the impossibility consists of legal impossibility the courts will hold
the contract void by reason of its subject-matter being unlawful. But when the contract
is not held invalid on the grounds of initial impossibility, the precise moment at which
the impossibility arises is of no mportance, and it is only impossibility existing at the
1967]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
The performance of a contract is morally impossible under So-
viet law when it would be "contrary to morality, in the particular
circumstances of the case, to insist upon the contract being com-
pletely performed."'" According to Professor Agarkov, the rule is
derived from Article 130 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.:
It is the duty of every citizen of the U.S.S.R. . . . , to respect the
rules of socialist intercourse.52
An example given is when the obligor, "being personally bound to
perform some act under contract, is overtaken by some illness ren-
dering the performance exceedingly painful though not physically
impossible."5 And, to enforce performance in such a case "would
be contrary to the rules of socialist human intercourse ... "54
Economic conditions which prevent performance of the contract
are not acceptable as a valid defense. For example, changes in market
conditions do not constitute a valid excuse for non-performance of
the contract.
In this type of case the Commission requires the strict performance
of contractual obligations by both parties, irrespective of economic
changes which [occurred] in the meanwhile. 55
The Commission in deciding cases of this type demands proof that the
fulfillment of the contract is impossible and that failure to fulfill the
terms of a contract is not simply a result of the lack of profits.56
The Commission followed this practice in deciding the case of
V/O Eksportles against the Belgian firm Ansien Etablissement Lui
de Naier.57 The suit arose when the Belgian firm refused to accept its
purchase of lumber products from Eksportles because of worsened
market conditions. The Commission held:
time when the performance becomes due that matters. Agarkov, supra note 44, at 10.
See also GsovsKI, supra note 8, at 57.
The defense of legal impossibility of performance, as such, is apparently not
common to actions brought before the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission. Cases
wherein the facts would support this defense have been decided with reference to the
presence or absence of objective impossibility arising under the terms of a force
majeure clause. See e.g., the Soviet-Israeli Oil Arbitration, Jordan Investments Ltd. v.
Soiuznefteksport (1958), where an impossibility to perform arose when the Soviet
government refused to issue an export license to its Combine and prohibited it from
delivering oil under contract to Israel during the Egyptian crisis. Domke, The Israeli-
Soviet Oil Arbitration, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 787 (1959). See also, Eksportles v. Piltenburg
(1938), noted in Berman, Force Majeure and the Denial of an Export License under
Soviet Law: A Comment on Jordan Investments Ltd v. Soiuznefteksport, 73 HARv.
L. REV. 1128, 1144 n.34 (1960).
51 Agarkov, supra note 44, at 10.
52 MOORE, MODERN CONSTITUTIONs 237 (1957).
53 Agarkov, supra note 44, at 10.
54 Ibid.
55 Ramzaitsev, supra note 11, at 132.
56 Hilton, supra note 11, at 98.
57 Id. at 98-9.
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... that the claimant had the indisputable right to demand fulfillment of
the contract by the defendant because neither in conformity with the
terms of the contract nor on the basis of the principles of internation-
ally accepted commercial practices did the defendant have the right to
refuse to carry out the terms of the contract because of a change in
market conditions. 58
The decisions of the State Arbitration Commission in the
"shawls" and "lorries" cases mentioned above5 9 can now be evaluated
in the light of the applicable Soviet law. It is readily apparent that
those decisions will not stand the light of ordinary Soviet law. There
is no indication in either case that actual, legal (in the usual sense) or
moral impossibility to perform existed. In both cases, the obligor's
inability to perform was due to a change in Soviet state planning.
Regardless of the use of the phrase "factually impossible" by the
arbitrator, clearly these are cases of economic impossibility.
When the central planning authority" issues a directive or
"planning act,"'" it is done solely to implement the National Eco-
nomic Plan; the action is necessarily economically motivated. It
must also follow that a change in planning-say, the rescission or
alteration of an existing "planning act" by a superseding directive
of the planning authority-is similarly economically motivated. Al-
though the directive may have the force and effect of law under the
"law of the plan" concept,62 it is nonetheless the result of an eco-
nomic rather than juridical decision on the part of the state authori-
ties. The question then to be asked is, will this doctrine of socialist
economic impossibility of performance be imposed on foreign mer-
chants?63 For example, suppose the customer for the "shawls" or
"lorries" had been a private American firm dealing under contract
with the Amtorg Trading Corporation at New York, and Amtorg
was prevented from delivering the goods by the change in planning.
Could Amtorg rely on this defense? As in the case of the trade mon-
58 ld. at 99. Conditions of war giving rise to economic hardship or changed
circumstances "can operate to discharge a contractor from performance only when
performance is absolutely impossible .... ." Agarkov, supra note 44, at 13.
59 Notes 42 and 43, supra.
60 See note 35, supra.
61 See note 37, supra.
62 See note 37, supra.
63 There is some indication that the rule would be limited to transactions between
"socialist" enterprises. "The debtor may be absolved from specific performance if the
planned assignment on which the obligation is based (this refers to relations between
socialist organisations) expires." (Emphasis added.) Commentary FCIvL, SCL&P 26.
Article 36 of FCIvL, in SCL&P at 74-75 deals with liability for breach of obligations
between "socialist organisations" and although it covers the situation where a "planned
assignment ... has become inoperative" prior to performance of the contract, it does
not speak of changes or cancellations of planned assignments. No case was found in
which the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission dealt with this issue.
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opoly "special rule," would the Soviets seek extraterritorial recogni-
tion of this defense of economic impossibility which is fundamental
to their socialist system under the "law of the plan?" If the situation
were reversed and an American private corporate subdivision had
failed to perform due to a change in planning of its Board of Direc-
tors,64 neither an American nor a Russian court would excuse it from
liability on that account.
Where there are commercial dealings between a private (capi-
talist) firm and a government acting in a proprietary capacity
through a state-owned (socialist) firm, it would be patently unfair
to deny the defense of impossibility of performance to the one party
whose non-performance was due to a private economic decision, and
at the same time grant the defense to the other party whose non-
performance was due to a public economic decision.
It is suggested that a simple treaty solution to this potential
problem would be to declare expressly that when changes in Soviet
economic planning result in the non-performance of a contract made
by a Soviet organization with an American firm, the Soviet socialist
organization shall be deemed to be at fault.
STATE TRADING AND THE DOCTRINE
OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The All-Union Ministry of Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R. has
absolute control and management of Soviet foreign trade.
65 The
Ministry is composed of many departments and sub-departments
which carry on the actual work required to realize the export-import
plans of the government. There are twenty-one major departments
directly under the Ministry plus the Scientific Research Institute
of Marketing Analysis and two institutions of higher learning: The
Academy of Foreign Trade and The Institute of Foreign Trade.
6
The actual commercial contacts between the Ministry of For-
eign Trade and foreign nations, private firms and individuals are
carried on through the several agencies under the Ministry's direct
control and supervision. The most important of these agencies are
the Soviet Trade Delegations, the Import-Export Combines and in
the case of the United States, the Amtorg Trading Corporation of
New York.67
14 See note 35, supra. Cf. Gosplan's role as planning authority.
65 Quoted in text accompanying note 8, supra.
66 TRADE RESEARCH 56-57; CHERVYAKOV, ORGANIZATSIYA I TEKNIKA VNESHNEI
TORGOVLI (The Organization and Technique of Soviet Foreign Trade) (Vneshnorgizdat,
1958) translated and condensed by Scott, 10 SOVIET STuDiEs 393, 394-6 (1959).
67 See note 12, supra.
[Vol. 7
1967] SOVIET-AMERICAN TRADE
The Trade Delegation (Torgpredstvo) represents the Soviet
Union in countries with which the Soviets have established trade
agreements and is a component of the Soviet diplomatic corps
abroad. Each delegation has virtually unrestricted power to negotiate
trade contracts with foreign firms in the name of any Soviet Com-
bine. The head of the Delegation is usually an official of the Ministry
of Foreign Trade and the other members are often officials of various
Combines or other Soviet industrial organizations.68 The Trade Dele-
gation, unlike the Trade Combine discussed below, is not a legal
entity under Soviet Law; it is not, in absence of treaty provision to
the contrary, responsible for its contracts or debts; it cannot sue;
and it may claim the defense of sovereign immunity if sued, unless
such immunity has been waived by treaty provision.69 Because of
the sovereign immunity problem,"0 the United States Government
has consistently refused Russian offers to send a Trade Delegation
to Washington and, to date, the United States Government has not
sought to enter into a treaty which could eliminate the problem.7
Concluding a Soviet-American trade agreement and installing a
Soviet Trade Delegation in the United States are diplomatic steps
68 TRADE RESEARCH 63.
69 Apparently the Soviet Union has always been willing to negotiate treaty pro-
visions which render the Trade Delegations legally responsible for contracts and otherjuridical acts done in the foreign country and also waive the right of the Government
to claim the defense of sovereign immunity in suits involving the Delegations. See, e.g.,
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Turkey, March 16, 1931, art. 12, in 2
SOVIET DOCUMENTS 479, 483; Treaty of Commerce between Japan and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, December 6, 1957, Annex, arts. 1-5, in 2 JAPANESE ANNUAL
INT'L L. 173, 177-9 (1958).
70 "It is a well recognized general proposition that upon request sovereign states
are granted immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign courts." Fensterwald, Sovereign
Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 HARV. L. REV. 614 (1950). "The immunity of
the State and of its property is founded on the principle of state sovereignay," Zourek
(Legal Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Science, Prague), Some Comments
on the Difficulties Encountered in the Judicial Settlement of Disputes Arising from
Trade Between Countries with Different Economic and Social Structures, 86 JOURNAL
Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL 639, 641 (1959). See generally Schmitthoff, The Claim of
Sovereign Immunity in the Law of International Trade, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 452
(1958).
71 The implication to be drawn from the American stand in this matter is that
were the United States to agree to the Russian offer to send an official Trade Delegation
to this country to negotiate and contract directly with American businessmen, a com-
mercial-legal relationship partial to the Russians would result. The Soviets do not
subscribe to the international-legal concept of "limited" or "relative" sovereign im-
munity. For a discussion of this concept, see Fensterwald, supra note 70 at 453-55;
and Zourek, supra note 70 at 647-665. Most American lawyers are familiar with this
concept, that a sovereign may be immune from suit when it acts in a governmental
capacity but is not immune when it acts in a proprietary or business capacity. See
also, Pisar, World Trade and the Soviet Bloc, Seminar Conducted by the Russian
Research Institute at Harvard University, December 16, 1960, at 10. See generally,
Seidl-Hohenveldern, Commercial Arbitration and State Immunity, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ARBITRATION 87-92.
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which should logically and eventually follow the adoption of the
Soviet-American Consular Treaty.
72
An essential part of any treaty that results from taking these
steps should be a clause protecting American businessmen from the
defense of sovereign immunity in suits involving Soviet Trade Dele-
gations.
CONCLUSION
American capitalists will surely approach with suspicion, and
should approach with caution, the unfamiliar juridical consequences
of Soviet socialist economic policy which has evolved from the
Soviets' dedicated pursuit of Lenin's belief that eventually society
would become "one office and one factory. '7' However, such con-
cerns should not discourage American businessmen from the careful
pursuit of Soviet trade, for as Maxim Litvinov suggested in 1933,
Soviet trade may have its advantages:
Our foreign trade policy is based on firm foundations which have
not been altered since the beginning of our foreign trade and which we
have no intention of changing .... This system has from our point of
view entirely justified itself .... This system should be recognized
* . as being of advantage also for the persons with whom we deal;
... When trade is distributed among many customers there is always a
certain percentage of loss from bankruptcies and in years of crisis this
percentage is particularly high. But this risk is non-existent when there
is trade with a single customer represented by such a powerful state as
the Soviet Union.
74
72 Note 2, supra.
73 SCHWARTZ, RUSSIA'S SOVIET ECONOMY 117 (2d ed. 1954).
74 3 SOVIET DOCUMENTS 14-15 (Degras, ed. 1952).
